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ABSTRACT
Graphical password composition is an important part of graphical user authentica-
tion which affects the strength of the chosen password. Considering that graphical
authentication is associated with visual search, perception, and information retrieval,
in this paper, we report on an eye-tracking study (N=109) that aimed to investigate
the effects of users’ cognitive styles towards the strength of the created passwords
and shed light into whether and how the visual strategy of the users during graph-
ical password composition is associated with the passwords’ strength. For doing
so, we adopted Witkin’s Field Dependence-Independence theory, which underpins
individual differences in visual information and cognitive processing, as graphical
password composition tasks are associated with visual search. The analysis revealed
that users with different cognitive processing characteristics followed different pat-
terns of visual behavior during password composition which affected the strength
of the created passwords. The findings underpin the need of considering human
cognitive characteristics as a design factor in graphical password schemes. The pa-
per concludes by discussing implications for improving recognition-based graphical
passwords through adaptation and personalization techniques based on individual
cognitive characteristics.
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1. Introduction
Graphical user authentication (GUA) has been proposed as an alternative to alphanu-
meric passwords for gaining access to systems and services, with Android Pattern Un-
lock and Windows Picture Passwords being two commercial examples of such schemes.
GUA entails users authenticating with the use of an image input and the aid of a
mouse/stylus, a touch screen, or gestures. GUA schemes lie under two categories,
depending on which memory function is triggered when they are being used; recall
and recognition. Recall-based GUA schemes require users to remember and reproduce
a drawing they have drawn before, often with the use of a background image as a
cue. Examples of recall-based GUAs are DAS (Jermyn et al., 1999), Pass-Go (Wein-
shall et al., 2004), and PassPoints (Wiedenbeck et al., 2005). Recognition-based GUA
schemes require users to identify and select target images from a challenge set. Ex-
amples of recognition-based GUAs are PassFaces (Brostoff and Sasse, 2000), DejaVu
(Dhamija and Perrig, 2000), and ImagePass (Mihajlov and Jerman-Blazˇicˇ, 2011).
GUA schemes have been proposed aiming to improve the usability and memorability
issues associated with the alphanumeric schemes (Melicher et al., 2016), which have
raised security issues since people have adopted workarounds for remembering their
passwords such as reuse of passwords or parts of their passwords or use of very simple
words (e.g., password, 123456 ) which constitute them easily guessable. Despite the fact
that graphical passwords are easier to remember, people still make predictable choices
when using GUA schemes which affect the strength of the created graphical passwords
(Salehi-Abari et al., 2008; Thorpe and Van Oorschot, 2007; Zhao et al., 2015) and
introduce security vulnerabilities. User choices are affected by several factors related
to the characteristics of the individuals and the characteristics of the GUA scheme.
Focusing on the characteristics of the individuals, researchers have investigated the
effect of gender (Mihajlov et al., 2016) and age (Nicholson et al., 2013). However,
GUA is an information processing task, and thus, individual cognitive characteristics
are expected to have an impact on the way the users create their graphical passwords.
Regarding human cognition, current research is limited to investigating memorability
issues in the login phase (Belk et al., 2017a). However, considering that the strength
of the chosen graphical password is determined during password composition, it is
important to investigate the effect of individual cognitive differences in the registration
phase. In this regard, Katsini et al. (2018b) revealed that human cognitive styles
influence the graphical password choices when using a recall-based GUA scheme.
Considering the results of the study on the recall-based GUA scheme (Katsini et al.,
2018b) and given that no study has been yet performed to investigate users’ choices
in the password composition phase of recognition-based GUA from a human cognitive
perspective, in this paper we adopt such a perspective and investigate how users react
to stimuli, through analysing their visual behaviour, aiming to understand how they
decide on the graphical passwords they create. This will allow us to draw conclusions
on the effects of cognitive styles on the strength of the created passwords, understand
whether and how these are associated with the users’ visual behaviour, and investigate
whether this knowledge could be used to design adaptive mechanisms that would
enable users to create stronger passwords.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: firstly, we discuss the related re-
search. Then, we present a user-study we conducted to investigate the interplay effects
between the users’ cognitive style and the strength of the created passwords. Next,
we present the main findings of the research endeavour, along with their implications.
Finally, we discuss the study validity and conclude the paper.
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2. Related Work
Considering that the password strength is associated with predictable user choices
which are interrelated with the memorability of the created passwords, researchers have
attempted to investigate which factors affect the user choices. They are affected, among
others, by human factors, such as gender, age and cultural background (Mihajlov and
Jerman-Blazˇicˇ, 2011; Nicholson et al., 2013), and GUA scheme characteristics, such as
grid size and image type (Belk et al., 2017b; De Luca et al., 2009), grid layout (Katsini
et al., 2018c), and design space (Stobert and Biddle, 2013).
A major parameter that influences the password strength is the type of images
used in the image grid. People make predictable choices when using images of people
as they tend to select images of people with similar cultural background to theirs
(Davis et al., 2004). When using images of single objects, people tend to select images
of business, food and drinks, plants, and games (Mihajlov et al., 2016). Thorpe et al.
(2014) revealed that password choices are affected by the use of colors, shapes, patterns,
and/or letters for remembering the order of the selection. The results are supported by
Mihajlov et al. (2016) who showed that people select images based on the shapes and
the colors they contain. Thorpe et al. (2014) also showed that a simple effect such as
gradually revealing the images of an image grid affects the users’ password choice and
Katsini et al. (2018c) showed that the image grid visualization (2D versus 3D layouts)
affects the strength of the created passwords.
From a human cognitive factor perspective, Chiasson et al. (2009) investigated the
effects of memory interference, an elementary cognitive process, on text-based and
graphical passwords. They focused on password interference when using multiple pass-
words and their research revealed that people make significantly fewer errors when
using graphical passwords than text-based passwords. Similar results were revealed
by Meng et al. (2016), whose research revealed that individuals who used the pattern
unlock mechanism outperformed those using the text-based mechanism, both in the
short-term and in the long-term. In another research, Everitt et al. (2009) investi-
gated the effects of password frequency, interference, and training. They found that
participants who accessed four different infrequent graphical passwords each week had
a failure rate more than ten times greater than participants accessing a single in-
frequent password. Stobert and Biddle (2013) explored the impact of different types
of memory retrieval (free-recall, cued-recall, and recognition-based) on the usability
and memorability of randomly assigned graphical passwords. Their study showed that
cued-recall was better than free-recall and that recognition-based graphical passwords
were more memorable than recall-based passwords. Huestegge and Pimenidis (2014)
analysed the impact of memory load in terms of number of faces to be remembered and
retention interval (hour, day, week, month) on performance in login tasks. They found
no evidence for strong performance deterioration when memory load increased. Longer
retention intervals yielded a slight increase in login failures, but post-hoc analyses in-
dicated that this was mainly due to the worse performance of few individuals in the
upper part of the age distribution of their sample. Search times increased with longer
retention interval, probably reflecting decay or retrieval problems in long-term mem-
ory. Regarding elementary cognitive processing abilities, Belk et al. (2013b) reported
that users with enhanced working memory and cognitive processing speed outper-
formed users with more limited processing abilities during textual and graphical login
tasks.
Belk et al. (2017a) investigated the effects of cognitive processing styles towards
users’ login performance and memorability of alphanumeric and graphical passwords.
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Their research revealed that users with individual differences in cognitive processing
styles (i.e., verbals vs. imagers, field-dependent vs. field-independent) perform signif-
icantly different during login with alphanumeric and graphical passwords. Imagers
outperformed Verbals (Belk et al., 2013a) and field-independent individuals outper-
formed field-dependent individuals (Belk et al., 2017a) in login tasks when using a
recognition-based GUA scheme. Katsini et al. (2018b) revealed that field-independent
individuals created stronger passwords when using a recall-based GUA scheme than
field-dependent individuals.
The aforementioned research suggests that the cognitive styles affect the users dur-
ing login tasks and there is evidence that the cognitive styles are reflected on the visual
behaviour patterns of individuals (Raptis et al., 2016b). Recent research in the user
authentication domain reveals that the visual behaviour during the password creation
is correlated with the password strength (Katsini et al., 2018b), enables attackers to
perform guessing attacks by identifying hot spots (Thorpe and Van Oorschot, 2007)
and can be used as gaze-based strength quantification metric for user-created graphical
passwords (Katsini et al., 2018d).
2.1. Motivation
From the discussion on the related work we can deduce that (a) existing research
focuses rather on the login task, and not on password composition and (b) there is no
research work which investigates whether users’ individual cognitive factors affect the
strength of recognition-based graphical passwords and whether they are reflected on
their visual behaviour during graphical password composition. Given the importance
of perception, visual search, and visual information comprehension in GUA tasks,
we argue that investigating the effect of users’ cognitive styles in graphical password
composition tasks can provide important insights about the value of considering human
cognitive differences in different technological contexts as a human design factor, in
both design and run time, aiming to offer personalized features to end-users based on
their individual cognitive styles.
Convinced that the eye plays an important role in understanding people’s intentions
and strategies while performing graphical password composition activities, in this pa-
per we adopt a cognitive theory interrelated with the ability of an individual to extract
visual information in graphical scenes to investigate how people choose graphical pass-
words. The Field Dependence-Independence (FD-I) theory suggests that individuals
have different habitual approaches, according to contextual and environmental condi-
tions, in processing graphical information, and accordingly characterizes individuals
as being either field-dependent (FD) or field-independent (FI). FD individuals tend
to follow a more holistic approach to process visual information and have difficulties
in identifying details in complex visual scenes (Witkin et al., 1975). FI individuals
tend to follow a more analytic approach to process visual information, pay attention
to details, and easily separate simple structures from the surrounding visual context
(Witkin et al., 1975). Our aim is to shed light into how people select their graphical
passwords, whether (and how) their visual strategy is associated with the passwords
they select, and investigate how this knowledge could be used to drive the design of
adaptive mechanisms that could affect people’s graphical password choices.
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3. Method of Study
We designed a study in which the participants were asked to use a recognition-based
GUA scheme to create a graphical password by selecting images from a large image
set. Considering that users nowadays mainly use desktop and mobile devices for web
browsing and logging in to services, we decided to use both types of interaction devices
aiming to increase the external validity of our study. We adopted a mixed-methods
research approach, based on the analysis of both qualitative and quantitative data,
aiming to examine whether cognitive differences during password creation affect the
strength of the created passwords, whether these are reflected in the users’ visual
behaviour and understand their password creation strategy. Based on the literature
and our motivation, we formed the following hypotheses:
H1. FI individuals create stronger passwords than FD individuals.
H2. The visual behavior of users with different cognitive styles (FD vs FI) is corre-
lated to the strength of the passwords they create.
H3. FI individuals have different visual behavior than FD individuals when creating
a password.
To investigate the hypotheses, we performed a statistical analysis, discussed in the
next section. We also performed a qualitative analysis to shed light into the users’ be-
havior and thoughts when creating a graphical password. For the qualitative analysis,
we used the eye-tracking recordings and an informal discussion with the users at the
end of the session.
3.1. Study Instruments
In our study, we used the following study instruments: i) a recognition-based GUA
scheme; ii) the GEFT test for classifying the participants into FD and FI groups; iii)
the interaction devices, and iv) the eye-tracking apparatus.
3.1.1. Graphical User Authentication (GUA) scheme
We used the recognition-based GUA scheme designed by Belk et al. (2017a), which
is depicted in Figure 1. This mechanism was designed and developed based on the
guidelines of well-cited recognition-based GUA mechanisms, such as DejaVu (Dhamija
and Perrig, 2000), PassFaces (Brostoff and Sasse, 2000), and ImagePass (Mihajlov and
Jerman-Blazˇicˇ, 2011). During user enrollment, the user is presented with a total of
120 images of objects in a single screen in a 9x14 image grid. The images cannot be
sorted or replaced and no adding or removing images is permitted. Each image can
only be used once in a graphical password. The use of single-object images was based
on recent research revealing that these are more memorable than faces and abstract
images (Chowdhury et al., 2013; Mihajlov and Jerman-Blazˇicˇ, 2011). To log in, the
user is provided with a set of 25 images which includes the 5 images selected by the
user and a set of 20 decoy images. The decoy images are randomly selected after the
password creation from the remaining images, they are shuffled with the 5 images of
the password and they are randomly positioned on the login grid, counterbalancing
the security aspect of the login stage (Belk et al., 2017a).
The selected GUA scheme policy requires a password of 5 ordered images and a
large pool of selection images to ensure a comparable theoretical entropy to that of
the commercially used 6-characters long password-based authentication mechanisms
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(Katsini et al., 2016). The entropy is measured in bits and is calculated through the
following equation (O’Gorman, 2003):
Hmax = log2Kp
The password key space Kp refers to the range of all possible values of password
combinations and is calculated by multiplying the character pool available for each of
the password characters. The maximum theoretical entropy of the GUA used in our
study is 34.41 bits.
Figure 1. The GUA mechanism used in our study. Users selected five unique images to form their graphical
password.
3.1.2. GEFT
To classify the participants as either FD or FI we used the Group Embedded Figures
Test (GEFT) by Oltman et al. (1971), which is the original classification FD-I tool.
GEFT is a credible and validated time-administered instrument (Khatib and Hos-
seinpur, 2011), which measures the ability of an individual to identify a simple figure
within a complex background. The test consists of three sections. In each section, the
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individual is asked to identify and outline a given simple pattern in a visually complex
context within a given amount of time. The first section consists of seven pattern-
recognition problems and the individual has two minutes to solve them. The second
and third section consist of nine pattern-recognition problems each, and the individual
has five minutes to complete each section. A raw score is calculated by summing the
correct answers in the last two sections, as the first section is used only for practice
purposes. Thus, the score ranges between 0 and 18 and the individuals are classified
as either FD or FI with the use of a cut-off score. In our study, the cut-off score was
determined to be 11, as it has been widely used in the literature (Angeli et al., 2009;
Hong et al., 2012; Raptis et al., 2016a). The cut-off score means that the participants
who score 11 or lower would be classified as FD, and those who score between 12 and
18 as FI.
3.1.3. Interaction devices
The study was conducted using two interaction devices: a standard desktop computer
and a mobile touch-screen device. The standard desktop computer had the following
technical specifications: Intel core i7 with 8GB RAM, Windows 10 operating system,
and an LG Monitor 22” 22MP48D at a screen resolution of 1920x1080 pixels (i.e.,
16:9) with a frequency of 50Hz. The mobile touch-based device was a Samsung P1000
Galaxy Tab tablet computer with a 7.0” monitor at a screen resolution of 600x1024
pixels (i.e., 3:4).
3.1.4. Eye-tracking apparatus
The eye-tracking equipment used in the study was the Tobii Pro Glasses 2. The system
captures data at 50Hz (i.e., the point of gaze was measured every 20 milliseconds).
Fixations were extracted using a customized velocity threshold identification (I-VT)
algorithm (Komogortsev et al., 2010), based on the I-VT algorithm provided by Tobii.
3.2. Metrics
3.2.1. Password strength metrics
To measure the generated graphical passwords’ strength, we used two password met-
rics: password guessability and password complexity. To measure the password guess-
ability, we used a brute-force approach which checked all possible combinations of
graphical passwords comprising of five unique images starting from the upper left of
the grid and traversing it row by row. We selected this for implementing the exhaus-
tive password search based on research findings which revealed that when users are
browsing a page of images they tend to scan the image grid in a horizontal pattern line
by line (Djamasbi et al., 2011; Shrestha and Lenz, 2007). Our aim for selecting this
approach was to reveal whether the relative position of the images on the image grid
has an impact on the images that people with different cognitive styles use to create
their password and whether this introduces security vulnerability to the GUA scheme.
The password guessability was measured in terms of number of guesses needed to crack
each password. The higher the number of guesses, the more difficult the password to
crack. To measure the password complexity, we used the equation developed by Sun
et al. (2014):
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PSP = Sp × log2 (Lp + Ip +Op)
In the above equation, Sp is the size of the password (i.e., total number of images);
Lp is the physical length of the password (i.e., the sum of the Euclidean distances
between the selected images of the password); Ip is the total number of intersections
(i.e., when two non-consecutive line segments have a common point); and Op is the
number of overlaps of the password pattern (i.e., when a line segment of the password
pattern is covered by another segment). The higher the score, the more complex the
password is.
3.2.2. Visual behavior metrics
In the present work we focused on visual behavior metrics which are related to vi-
sual decision-making tasks (Raptis et al., 2016b) and can contribute towards drawing
conclusions for the strength of the created graphical passwords. Our visual behavior
metrics are: the number of fixated images, the total fixation duration, and the Eu-
clidean scanpath distance. The number of fixated images metric is used to measure
how many unique images the user has fixated on during the password creation task.
This metric is associated with the actual choice pool of the users (in parallel to the key-
pool for the text-based authentication schemes), meaning that an image can only be
chosen by the users, as part of their password, only if they have fixated on it. The total
fixation duration metric is the total duration of fixations of an individual within the
image grid, considering visits and revisits to the images, during the graphical password
composition task. It is associated with the visual attention, as large duration reflects
on high level of attention (Rayner, 1977). The Euclidean scanpath distance metric
is the aggregation of the straight-line distance between two sequential fixated points
of the image grid. It reflects on the difference between fixation sequence alignment
distances and reveals the way a user searches for information, such as analytic style
(Feusner and Lukoff, 2008). Typically, the visual behaviour metrics are performed on
areas-of-interest (AOIs), which are clustered sub-regions of the displayed stimuli in
which the eye-tracking metrics are applied (Steichen et al., 2014). In our study, each
image of the GUA mechanism is an AOI.
3.3. Participants
A total of 109 individuals (50 females and 59 males) participated in our study. Their
age ranged between 18 and 47 years (M = 30.5, SD = 7.3). Twenty-eight participants
were undergraduate university students; thirty-six participants were postgraduate stu-
dents; forty-five participants were professionals. Participants did not have any vision
problems or had corrected to normal vision (i.e., wore glasses). The recruitment took
place by communicating the research via social media, mailing lists, posting flyers on
bulletin boards at various places on campus, and directly contacting acquaintances of
the research team. To increase study validity, we aimed to recruit participants that
had no experience with a recognition-based GUA mechanism to avoid any familiarity
effects. Based on the users’ GEFT scores, 53 participants were classified as FD and 56
participants as FI (GEFT score: M = 11.27, SD = 3.51, min = 3, max = 18). The
scores of the participants were normally distributed according to Shapiro-Wilk’s test
(p = .085). Regarding the interaction device, the first half of the participants were
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assigned to the desktop device and the rest half to the tablet. 54 participants used the
desktop computer (26 FDs, and 28 FIs), and 55 participants used the tablet computer
(27 FDs, 28 FIs).
3.4. Procedure
To increase the ecological validity of the users’ interactions with the GUA mechanism,
participants were asked to create a password that they would use for their email
account since people tend to create more secure passwords when they are asked to
secure their email account (Florencio and Herley, 2007). They were informed about
the data that would be collected during the study session and that it would be stored
anonymously and used only for research purposes by the research group, and they all
provided their consent. No details in regards to the research objective were provided
prior to the study, to avoid any bias effects. Participants were informed that they could
opt out at any point of the study session.
Each participant visited our lab at a previously agreed date and time. The study was
conducted in a quiet room in the lab. The procedure involved the following steps: first,
the participants were introduced to the task and familiarized with the eye-tracking
equipment. Then, the participants wore the eye-tracking equipment; participants wear-
ing glasses were allowed to wear the eye-tracking equipment on top of their glasses.
The eye-tracking equipment was calibrated based on the procedure described in the
user-manual provided by Tobii AB (2017). Then, the participants were asked to look
at the screen and create a graphical password, by creating a username in the first step
and then selecting five images in a specific order from a set of 120 images using either a
desktop or a tablet computer. The position of each image on the image grid remained
the same for all participants during the registration phase. Given that participants
had no prior experience with GUA schemes, instructions on the authentication policy
were provided and participants were free to ask any questions before proceeding to the
password creation. Next, the participants completed the GEFT test; the researchers
calculated the GEFT score of the participants and classified them as either FD or
FI based on the cut-off score, as discussed in GEFT section. To ensure participants
did not create their passwords at random and increase the external validity of the
study, they were asked to use the login details they have created to answer a short
questionnaire on demographics. Finally, an informal discussion on the strategy of the
users took place, after answering the questionnaire.
4. Results
4.1. The effect of FD-I on password strength
To investigate H1, we performed a between-subjects two-way MANOVA test, with
cognitive style (FD or FI) and interaction device (desktop or tablet computer) as
the independent variables, and the combined security metric (i.e., guessability and
complexity) as the combined dependent variable. The residual analysis for the guess-
ability test revealed that the data was not normally distributed across all independent
variables, and thus we transformed them using the two-steps approach proposed by
Templeton (2011). After this transformation, the test met the required assumptions
(i.e., linear relationship between the dependent variables; no evidence of multicollinear-
ity; no univariate or multivariate outliers in the data; dependent variables data were
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Figure 2. FIs created stronger (left) and more complex (right) passwords than FDs.
normally distributed; homogeneity of covariance matrices and variances).
The analysis revealed that FI individuals created stronger passwords, in terms of
guessability and complexity, than FD individuals, F2,104 = 3.582, p = .031, Wilks
′
Λ = .936, partial η2 = .064. Follow-up univariate two-way ANOVAs were performed.
There were statistically significant differences in the adjusted mean for both password
guessability (F1,105 = 4.144, p = .022, partial η
2 = .038) and complexity (F1,105 =
4.852, p = .015, partial η2 = .044). FIs’ passwords required 2.768 billion more guesses
(95% CI, 1.201 billion to 5.628 billion) to be cracked than FDs’. Moreover, FIs created
1.702 (95% CI, .170 to 3.228) more complex passwords than FDs. No effects of the
interaction device were found. The results are depicted in Figure 2.
4.2. Association between password strength and visual behavior
To assess the relationship between the strength of the created passwords and the visual
behavior (H2) taking into consideration the influence of the FD-I cognitive style, we
ran a series of partial Pearson correlations. All assumptions were met (i.e., linear
relationship between the variables; no significant outliers; dependent variables data
were normally distributed). Regarding the number of the fixated images, the analysis
revealed a strong correlation with both password guessability (r = .646, p = .012)
and complexity (r = .685, p = .008). Regarding the fixation duration, the analysis
revealed a moderate correlation with password guessability (r = .385, p = .031) and
a strong correlation with password complexity (r = .545, p = .025). Regarding the
Euclidean scanpath distance, the analysis revealed a moderate correlation with both
password guessability (r = .301, p = .037) and complexity (r = .305, p = .033). The
correlation analysis results are summarized in Table 1. Therefore, the users’ visual
behavior influenced the strength of the created graphical passwords.
4.3. The effect of FD-I on visual behavior
To investigate H3, we performed a between-subjects two-way MANOVA test, with
cognitive style (FD or FI) and interaction device (desktop or tablet computer) as the
independent variables and the combined eye-tracking metrics (i.e., number of fixated
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Table 1. Pearson correlation analysis between the strength of the graphical passwords and the visual behavior
metrics.
Number of fix-
ated images
Mean fixation
duration per
image
Euclidean scan-
path distance
Password guess-
ability
r = .646
p = .012
r = .385
p = .031
r = .301
p = .037
Password com-
plexity
r = .685
p = .008
r = .545
p = .025
r = .305
p = .033
Figure 3. FIs fixated GUA for longer time (left), fixated more GUA images (middle), and produced longer
scanpaths (right) than FDs.
images, total fixation duration, and Euclidean scanpath distance) as the dependent
variables. To normalize the data across all independent variables, we followed the two-
steps approach proposed by Templeton (2011). After the transformation, the test met
the required assumptions.
The analysis of the results revealed that that FI individuals have different visual
behaviour than FD individuals when creating a password, F3,103 = 14.309, p < .001,
Wilks′ Λ = .706, partial η2 = .294. Follow-up univariate two-way ANOVAs were
performed. There were statistically significant differences in the adjusted mean for
fixation duration (F(1,105) = 27.898, p < .001, partial η
2 = .210), number of fixated
images (F1,105 = 36.640, p < .001, partial η
2 = .259), and Euclidean scanpath distance
(F1,105 = 23.785, p < .001, partial η
2 = .185).
Regarding fixation duration, FIs fixated on the images for 16.112 seconds (95% CI,
10.603 to 22.163) more than FDs. Regarding the number of fixated images, FIs fixated
on 20.810 more images (95% CI, 13.991 to 27.622) than FDs. Regarding the Euclidean
distance of the scanpath, FIs produced 3.692 longer scanpaths (95% CI, 2.296 to 5.088)
than FDs. No effects of the interaction device were found. The results are depicted in
Figure 3.
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4.4. Analysis of password creation strategies
To provide supportive insights for the conclusions drawn from the quantitative analysis
and shed light in the users’ password creation strategies, we performed a qualitative
analysis on the informal discussions’ data and supported the results with the qualita-
tive data of their visual behavior during the task. After completing the task, partici-
pants were asked about the strategy they followed to create their graphical passwords.
FDs reported creating their authentication keys in a random way based on images that
caught their attention or images related to things they like, mainly located at the top
of the image grid. Some reported that they memorized the name of the objects in the
images they selected and others that they created a pattern (e.g., Z-shape). They con-
sidered they had too many images on the grid and they got anxious with the number
of the images. They focused on the goal, which was to select five images, rather than
think of how they would create a strong and easy-to-remember password. When they
were asked about the categories of the images they have seen, they reported of having
seen shoes, electronics, food, fruits, and flowers. Very few of them reported sports,
vegetables, and other categories located at the bottom part of the image grid. When
asked to log in after completing the GEFT test, they had difficulties in remembering
the selected password. Most reported that they were expecting to view the same im-
age grid during login and they could remember where the images were located on the
registration image grid and had difficulties with identifying them on the login image
grid. In addition, FD users answered negatively in the question of whether they would
remember their graphical key after a month. Some interesting comments received by
FD users were the following:
”I thought the shoes would be easy to remember. But, there were only
four shoes provided so I selected the egg only because I thought I would
remember it. When logging in, I could not remember the order of the
images because the shoes were not provided in the same order.” ∼ P02
”I selected the first five images because I thought the images would be
provided in the same order during login so it would be easy to remember
the password.” ∼ P32
”The [selected] images relate to things currently related to my life; for
example I’m planning to buy a camera, that’s why I selected it. I’m an
engineer that’s why I added the calculator. I play football and basketball
and I ate a banana in the morning.” ∼ P48
”I selected the flower images because they appealed to me, I didn’t think
of a specific order, I just started adding them from left to right until I got
five of them. If the order of the images changed, I would not remember
the correct order.” ∼ P93
Observing the visual behavior of the FD individuals allowed us to draw conclusions
about their strategy during password composition. Their attention was drawn by im-
ages located at the top of the image grid. They selected the first image after scanning
a very small part of the image grid. They mainly focused on the first two rows of the
image grid, as there was a lot of visual information they had to explore and none of
the images stood out. In their eyes, the whole grid was seeking their attention and
given their inherent difficulties in exploring visually complex scenes they limited their
search activity at the top few rows of the grid. In Figure 4:left a typical heatmap of
an FD individual is depicted.
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Figure 4. Heatmaps for FDs (left) and FIs (right)
On the other hand, FI users took more time to read the instructions carefully, browse
the images and select their authentication keys. Their selection strategy was mainly
based on their daily routine and included images related to their hobbies. Others
created stories starting with an image that caught their attention and associated the
order of the selected images with the stories they made up. Some reported of selecting
objects with common visual features (e.g., color) or functional features (e.g., shoes)
and ordering them alphabetically or visually (e.g., biggest object first). At first, they
scanned the image grid carefully to see the available options and then they moved
to selecting the images of their graphical password. They carefully thought of the
order that they would select them, and they often used the drag-and-drop option to
change the order of the images on the password before submitting it. When they were
asked about the categories of the images they have seen, they reported almost all the
categories of the images, and they could even remember their location on the image
grid (i.e. top, middle, bottom). They were all positive that they would remember the
created keys after a month, and they did not face any difficulty with remembering
their key when they were asked to log in immediately after completing the GEFT
test. Some interesting comments received by FI users were the following:
”I selected and ordered the images based on my everyday gym routine.”
∼ P29
”I selected the first image because I thought it was appealing. Then I
found all images of the same color and ordered the objects alphabetically
to create a password that I would remember later on.” ∼ P52
”I liked the cookie image, so I decided to use it. Then, I tried to find
images with ’missing’ parts of the cookie and created a story of adding
one element each time to create the whole cookie.” ∼ P67
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”I selected all the images that create an outfit. I would have started
with clothes, but no such image was provided so I used the high heels,
the purse, the scarf, the sunglasses and the button.” ∼ P88
Observing the visual behavior of the FI individuals reveals their inherent ability to
explore visually complex scenes (Aydın et al., 2013). They started with scanning the
image grid almost sequentially row by row and spent half the password creation time
in investigating the image grid. When they had an idea of the categories of the images,
they decided on the approach they would use to create the password. Based on this
approach, they searched for suitable images. In this second search round, they did not
follow a row-by-row approach, but, because they already had an idea of the location
of the images on the grid, they instead jumped from one point to another quickly. In
Figure 4:right a typical heatmap of an FI individual is depicted.
To sum up, the password creation strategies of FD individuals were less organized
and were based mainly on images that caught their attention and they often used the
location of the images on the image grid to memorize their passwords. On the other
hand, FI individuals were self-motivated when creating their passwords and either
used objects with specific visual or functional features or created a story and used the
images to fill their story.
5. Findings and Implications
5.1. Findings
The results of the study suggest that the human cognitive factors affect the graphical
passwords’ strength when using a recognition-based GUA scheme. The unique charac-
teristics of the FD and FI individuals influenced the strategy they followed to create
a graphical password, which is reflected in their visual behavior. The analysis of the
strength of the graphical passwords of the FDs and the FIs revealed that FIs created
more difficult to guess and more complex passwords than FDs (Figure 2). Observing
the users’ visual behavior allowed us to draw conclusions in regards to their graphi-
cal password creation strategy and associate this with the quantitative results of the
study. A summary of the findings of the study is provided in Table 2.
Overall, FIs followed a more analytic image exploration approach, as they fixated on
more images, produced more fixations and for longer time and had bigger Euclidean
scanpath distances. Rather than selecting images that immediately caught their at-
tention, they inherently created a goal of exploring their options before deciding on
which images they would use to create their password (Figure 4: right). Then, their
self-motivational characteristic led them to create the goal of making a memorable
password, after having decided which approach would be a better fit based on the
available images. Observing their visual behavior confirmed this strategy since they
explored the image grid at first and then they decided on how they would create their
password and searched for those images that would better meet their goal. Their an-
alytic nature guided them to order their images based on a pattern (e.g., everyday
habits) and, unlike the FDs, they consciously picked among similar images the one
that best matched their goal. For example, they were aware that there are two ice
cream images on the image grid and they selected the cone ice cream instead of the
ice cream cup.
On the other hand, FDs were overwhelmed with the number of images available
and the holistic approach they followed did not help them create strong passwords.
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Table 2. Effects of FD-I cognitive style on password strength and on individuals’ visual behavior, while
creating their graphical password using the recognition-based GUA scheme.
Metric Finding
Password
strength
Guessability • More guesses were required to crack FIs’
passwords than FDs’ passwords: F1,105 = 4.144,
p = .022, partial η2 = .038 (Figure 2)
• Password guessability was strongly corre-
lated with visual behavior (Number of fixated
images: r = .646, .012; Mean fixation duration
per image: r = .385, p = .031; Euclidean scan-
path distance: r = .301, p = .037; Table 1)
Complexity • FIs created more complex passwords than
FDs: F1,105 = 4.852, p = .015, partial η
2 = .044
(Figure 2).
• Password complexity was strongly corre-
lated with visual behavior (Number of fixated
images: r = .685, .008; Mean fixation duration
per image: r = .545, p = .025; Euclidean scan-
path distance: r = .305, p = .033; Table 1)
Visual
behavior
Fixation duration on
images
• FIs fixated on the GUA images for longer
periods than FDs, F(1,105) = 27.898, p < .001,
partial η2 = .210 (Figure 3)
Number of fixated
images
• FIs fixated on more GUA images than FDs,
F1,105 = 36.640, p < .001, partial η
2 = .259
(Figure 3)
Scanpath length • FIs produced longer fixations than FDs,
F1,105 = 23.785, p < .001, partial η
2 = .185
(Figure 3)
They explored a very small number of images located mainly at the top half of the
image grid (Figure 4: left) and thus they decreased the probability of selecting stronger
passwords as they unwittingly made their selection from a smaller image pool. They
selected images based on the position of the images on the image grid that related to
their interests, but did not pay attention to their order despite that they were aware
of the password policy of the GUA scheme. Observing their visual behavior during the
graphical creation task revealed that they spent very few time to explore the image
grid and rather immediately started selecting their images. They had not planned on
their password creation strategy, but were rather guided by the images. They selected
images that were associated with social interactions (e.g., images that represent team
sports), which reflects their inherent tendency for communication. Given that they
remember faces easier than objects (Pithers, 2002), the use of images of single-objects
may have hindered the FDs from visually exploring the image grid.
The reported study suggests that the current one-size-fits-all approach is not the
best solution for GUA as the GUA characteristics and the design space may be unin-
tentionally either favoring or hindering people with specific cognitive characteristics.
For example, the large number of images frustrated the FDs and thus they did not
create strong passwords. Considering that cognitive styles rarely change through lifes-
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pan (Wapner and Demick, 1992), studies like the reported one could drive the design
of personalized GUAs that adapt to individual cognitive styles. Simple mechanisms,
such as use of different types of images or use of different image grid layouts, could
be elaborated to help users of different cognitive styles improve the strength of the
passwords they create.
5.2. Implications
The main findings of the study underpin the value of considering cognitive styles (e.g.,
FD-I) as a human design factor, in both design and run-time and transforming the
inter-dependencies between human and GUA design factors into formal representa-
tions modeling users’ individual characteristics, and accordingly provide adaptive and
personalized GUA schemes. In this context, there are two major challenges for apply-
ing recognition-based GUA schemes that cater for the cognitive styles of the users: the
adaptation and personalization of the image grid based on the users’ cognitive style
and the run-time elicitation of the cognitive style.
Adaptation and personalization of image-grid layout in recognition-based
graphical authentication based on FD-I differences: The exploration of a rather
small part of the image grid by the FDs indicates the importance of displaying images
in ways that are easily perceived by users and ensure equal distribution of attention
to all images regardless of where they are located on the screen. Considering that in
this study we used a single 9x14 image grid, and that visual behavior revealed that
both FD and FI users fixated only on part of the images provided, alternative ap-
proaches of laying out the images should be considered, especially when providing a
large number of images in order to achieve comparable theoretical entropy to that
of the text-based mechanisms. The analysis of the results revealed that FD users se-
lected images randomly, but the strength of the created passwords could be increased
if the images were presented in a way that would guide the users to pay attention to
all the provided images, for example by illustrating multiple, smaller grids of images
and preventing password selection until the user has scanned a certain percentage
of the images (Katsini et al., 2018c). This could be used in combination with pass-
word strength metrics that derive from the users’ visual behavior during the password
creation task, such as gaze-based entropy introduced in Katsini et al. (2018d). The
observed differences on the visual behavior of the FDs and the FIs necessitate the
use of adaptation and personalization techniques for guiding users to scan the entire
image grid through adjusting the GUA interface, based on the individual cognitive
strategies. Given that FI individuals scanned more images than FD individuals, alter-
native layouts could improve the visibility of the images located at the bottom part
of the image grid. Given that FIs scanned around sixty images on average, a suitable
approach could be providing two image grids, each consisting of sixty images. For the
FD individuals, given that they fixated on around forty images on average they could
be provided with three image grids, consisting of forty images each, to ensure better
visibility of the total choice pool. In both cases, it should be investigated whether the
users should be guided to view all image grids or if it should be left to them to decide
on their approach. FI individuals, due to their analytic nature may be more likely to
explore the whole image grid, while FD individuals may require more help from the
mechanism for viewing all images of the grid. For example, they could be hindered
from selecting a password unless they have visited at least two of the three image grids.
To improve users’ behavior by guiding them to scan more images and assist them to
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create stronger and more complex passwords, several mechanisms can be used, such
as gradually revealing the image grid (Thorpe et al., 2014), use of 3D presentation
techniques (Katsini et al., 2018c), and use of saliency masks for those images that are
most likely to attract visual attention to spots on the image grid that were given much
attention based on eye-gaze data (Katsini et al., 2018b).
Run-time elicitation of FD-I characteristics based on visual behavior dif-
ferences of users: Aiming to apply adaptation and personalization techniques in
graphical password schemes based on human cognitive styles, as discussed before, the
elicitation of users’ FD-I characteristics is required. Nowadays, the FD-I style is iden-
tified through in-lab time-consuming techniques which require human intervention
(e.g., facilitator, test reviewer). These are credible and validated explicit elicitation
techniques, but they make real time integration of such human cognitive factors im-
practical in interactive system design, because the process cannot be conducted solely
by electronic equipment and human intervention is necessary. To overcome this issue,
an eye-tracking-based implicit method elicitation could be used, considering that there
is a strong correlation between the cognitive style and the visual behavior of the users
(Raptis et al., 2016b). Raptis et al. (2017) proposed a multi-factorial framework, based
on eye-tracking, to implicitly elicit the users’ FD-I style in real time. According to this
framework, a set of areas of interest are defined within a visual activity, based on the
activity characteristics (e.g., type, difficulty, sequence). Based on the areas of inter-
est, suitable low-level (e.g., number of fixations, fixation duration) and/or high-level
(e.g., scan-paths) eye-tracking metrics are used to elicit implicitly and in real time the
cognitive style, through intelligent and automatic modelling processes. Accordingly,
the framework proposed by Raptis et al. (2017) could be bootstrapped based on the
eye-tracking differences of FD-I users as described above. Each of the images of the
GUA mechanism used in our study is defined as an area of interest, which enables the
framework to measure the differences between the FD and the FI individuals based
on the metrics discussed earlier (i.e., fixation duration and fixation count) and elicit
the cognitive style of the users in real time before selecting the first image during
graphical password creation. Recent studies in implicit cognition-based user-modeling
when using graphical user authentication schemes (Katsini et al., 2018a; Raptis et al.,
2017) are moving towards this direction.
6. Study validity
This research work entails several limitations inherent to the multidimensional charac-
ter and complexity of the factors investigated. Regarding internal validity, the study
environment and the study procedure remained the same for all participants. The
methodology and statistical tests used to answer the research objectives met all the
required assumptions, despite the rather limited size of the sample. Moreover, the
confounding of factors other than FD-I cognitive style (e.g., gender, age, device) was
considered, and no effects were revealed. Focusing on the study instruments, we used
GEFT test to classify an individual as either FD or FI based on a cut-off score. Con-
sidering that the GEFT test highlights cognitive differences along a continuum scale,
the use of a cut-off score might not classify correctly individuals that fall in between
the two end points (e.g., Field-mixed (Angeli et al., 2009)). However, it is impor-
tant to stress that the distribution of users’ scores on the GEFT test in our sample
is comparably similar to general public GEFT test scores as shown in several studies
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with individuals with different demographics (Khatib and Hosseinpur, 2011; Rittschof,
2010). Finally, the guessability of the passwords was measured using an exhaustive key
search. Despite that there are other more advanced algorithms for guessing the graph-
ical passwords based on user choices (Davis et al., 2004), the scope of this paper is to
use the password guessability as a measure for comparing passwords created by FDs
and FIs rather than compare cracking algorithms for graphical passwords.
With regards to the ecological validity of the study, the sessions were performed
in times and days convenient for each participant. We used only one recognition-
based GUA mechanism, although numerous others are available and worth studying
too. However, the selected recognition-based GUA mechanism has been used in other
studies (Belk et al., 2017a; Katsini et al., 2017) and is based on popular recognition-
based GUA schemes, such as DejaVu (Dhamija and Perrig, 2000), PassFaces (Brostoff
and Sasse, 2000), and ImagePass (Mihajlov and Jerman-Blazˇicˇ, 2011). To increase the
ecological validity, participants were asked to create a password that they would use
for an important account, such as email account, since people tend to create more
secure passwords when they are asked to secure such types of accounts (Florencio and
Herley, 2007). We also note that the use of an eye-tracking technology was a limitation,
as the individuals rarely use such equipment when interacting with authentication
schemes. However, the fact that the eye-tracking technology used in the study were
wearable glasses, made the participants feel more comfortable after a while, as they
could interact with the system as they would normally do.
Regarding the study external validity (i.e., to what extent an effect can be general-
ized), our participants’ age-span was limited, ranging from 18 to 47. However, the fact
that the ages were normally distributed and that the GEFT scores are comparably
similar to general public across populations with varying demographics (Angeli et al.,
2009; Hong et al., 2012; Khatib and Hosseinpur, 2011) contribute to the study gener-
alizability. The participation of older subjects is required and will be considered in our
future research attempts, to increase the external validity of the study. It is also impor-
tant to stress out that participants used popular devices (desktop and tablet computer)
to create their graphical passwords. We expect that our results will be replicated for:
a) other types of recognition-based GUA schemes, b) other types of interaction device
(e.g., virtual reality head-mount displays), and c) applications that embrace visual
decision-making tasks which can be found in varying domains, besides security, such
as e-shopping, e-learning, gaming, and engineering. Finally, given the self-reporting
and complex nature of the presented experimental design, similar research attempts
are required in order to acquire a deeper understanding about the interplay between
human cognitive differences, visual behavior, and graphical authentication, and thus,
increase the validity of this research.
7. Ethical Considerations
Our research incorporated appropriate consideration of ethical issues into the design,
conduction, and analysis of the research study. Our research involved interaction with
human subjects, and it was performed under context-specific ethical guidelines. Re-
searchers actively respected the human rights and dignities of all those involved in the
user study and appropriately addressed questions of consent, capacity, power relations,
deception, confidentiality, and privacy. All individuals who participated voluntarily in
our research study agreed to and signed a consent form that their interactions with
the graphical authentication scheme would be recorded and analyzed anonymously as
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part of an experimental user study of the researchers’ group. Participants could bring
the experiment to an end at any time and for any reason. During the experiment,
the researchers had the authority to bring it to an end, if there was probable cause
to believe that it could harm the participants in any way. Moreover, all participants
were informed about the experiment procedure and the rights they had as volunteers.
However, no further details about the aim of the study were provided to them in order
to avoid bias effects. Finally, the research team conducted the study and analyzed the
data with rigor, respect, and responsibility.
8. Conclusion
This paper revealed that FD-I cognitive style of users influenced the strength of the
created passwords, in terms of generated password guessability and complexity, when
using a recognition-based GUA scheme. It also revealed that individual FD-I cognitive
style was correlated with the users’ visual behavior (i.e., the total fixation duration,
the number of unique fixated images, and the Euclidian scanpath length) during the
password creation task.
We interpreted the differences on the visual behavior between the FIs and the FDs
from a cognitive science theory perspective, which was backed up also by a qualita-
tive analysis of the strategies of the users when creating their graphical passwords.
Hence, we argue that recognition-based graphical passwords can be improved through
adaptation and personalization techniques to assist users with different individual cog-
nitive styles during graphical password composition tasks. Such implications were also
discussed in the paper.
Bearing in mind that recent research attempts (Bulling et al., 2012; Cantoni et al.,
2015; Galdi et al., 2016; Khamis et al., 2017; Song et al., 2016) try to incorporate
novel authentication schemes based on eye-tracking methods and users’ gaze patterns,
studies like the reported one provide valuable insights for further understanding the
complexity and interplay among users’ high-level cognitive factors and eye gaze be-
havior within graphical authentication tasks.
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